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Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers,
538 U.S. 135 (2003)
Richard J. Lazarus
Howard and Katherine Aibel Professor of Law
N
orfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers would not make the list of any 
Supreme Court scholar’s top twenty (or one hundred) opinions 
authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg during her twenty terms on the 
Court. But her opinion for the Court in that 00 case speaks volumes 
about the kind of Justice she is, and the profound difference her voice has 
made on the Court.
  Norfolk & Western Railway was not on first, second, or third glance 
a case anyone would have supposed warranted Supreme Court review. 
The case arose under the Federal Employers Liability Act and neither of 
the questions presented by the petition for certiorari was remotely cer-
tworthy, especially given the absence of any written opinion, published 
or unpublished, by a lower court on either issue. A state trial judge had 
denied, without written opinion, Norfolk & Western Railway’s objec-
tions to two jury instructions and declined to adopt Norfolk’s proposed 
jury instructions. In the first instruction, the judge allowed the jury to 
award the plaintiffs for their reasonable fear of cancer but only as that fear 
related to their suffering from asbestosis. The second instruction allowed 
for joint and several liability.
  The jury awarded $5,89,000 in total damages for all six plaintiffs, 
but without any suggestion that any of that award was for fear of cancer 
rather than just for the serious, debilitating asbestosis from which all six 
were admittedly suffering. Norfolk’s appeals in West Virginia state court 
produced no written opinion. There was no intermediate state appellate 
court and the state supreme court denied discretionary review. In short, 6
the lower court record consisted of nothing more than a bare-bones gen-
eral jury verdict for a relatively inconsequential amount. No meaningful 
precedent had been made of any kind, in legal or practical effect.
  Yet, not only did the Court defy conventional wisdom by granting 
review in the first instance, but the Court then incongruously affirmed 
rather than reversed the lower court judgment. Where, as in Norfolk the 
Court grants review in a plainly uncertworthy case, it does so almost only 
for one reason: to reverse a judgment the Justices believe to be lacking 
any possible merit, typically on a summary basis without full briefing and 
oral argument. But in Norfolk, the Court instead granted plenary review 
and then affirmed on the merits.
  In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court first ruled that 
the state trial judge had acted reasonably in declining to grant the defense 
counsel request that the plaintiffs not be allowed to recover damages 
based on reasonable fear of cancer related to their asbestosis. The major-
ity reasoned that the jury instruction was reasonable and entirely consis-
tent with long-standing common law tort doctrine because, as expressly 
instructed, the plaintiffs’ emotional distress injuries were limited to those 
parasitic to a physical injury (asbestosis). The trial judge therefore had 
not, contrary to settled tort doctrine (and Supreme Court FELA prec-
edent), permitted a “stand-alone” claim for emotional distress injuries. 
On the second issue, the Court ruled unanimously that FELA expressly 
provided for joint and several liability, and therefore Norfolk was liable 
for all the damages even though certain plaintiffs may have been exposed 
to asbestos fibers in other workplaces as well.
  Neither of the Court’s rulings established significant new precedent. 
For most readers of the opinion, the most intriguing aspect of the opin-
ion was likely the unusual breakdown of Justices on the first issue and the 
contrasting unanimity on the second. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
on the fear of cancer issue was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Anto-
nin Scalia, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas. The oddity of the split 
provides at most the basis for an amusing question for a Supreme Court 
trivia contest: The only common denominator for those in dissent (Chief 7
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony 
Kennedy, and Stephen Breyer) is that they, unlike any of the Justices in 
the majority, attended Stanford University for either law school or their 
undergraduate education.
  What makes the case so revealing of Justice Ginsburg, however, are nei-
ther the rulings themselves nor the unusual vote lineups of the Justices. 
What is instead most remarkable is the final word of the Court’s opin-
ion—“affirmed”—because the Court’s actual opinion on the fear of can-
cer issue could instead have readily supported a reversal on that ground.
  Embedded in the Court’s ruling on the threshold fear of cancer is-
sue was the Court’s express qualification that “it is incumbent upon [the 
plaintiff] to prove that his alleged fear is genuine and serious.” The prob-
lem for the plaintiffs was that the jury instructions in Norfolk & Western 
Railway required no such proof and plaintiffs never purported to offer 
such proof. Just the opposite. The plaintiffs had instead argued at trial 
that no such threshold showing of objective significance was required to 
sustain the reasonable fear of cancer jury instruction. The plaintiffs ar-
gued the same before the Court. The Norfolk majority further questioned 
the likely sufficiency of plaintiffs’ proof of a reasonable fear of cancer by 
describing the plaintiffs’ proof as “notably thin” and by acknowledging 
that the jury instruction “might well have succumbed to a straight for-
ward sufficiency-of-the-evidence objection.”
  The Court, however, then stepped back from disturbing the verdict by 
characterizing the nature of Norfolk’s objections at trial as not embrac-
ing these particular infirmities. But the majority could have concluded 
otherwise. The Court could have readily ruled that Norfolk’s broader 
objections to the jury instruction fairly included the lesser claim that the 
proof must establish the severity of the fear and therefore the jury verdict 
could not be sustained.
  The question is, why did the Court decline to insist on the fullest pos-
sible application of its opinion and to credit Norfolk’s broad objection. As 
counsel who represented the plaintiffs in this case, I think I know what 
drove Justice Ginsburg in crafting the Court’s opinion. Not anything I did 8
as an advocate. Nor the kind of finer point of civil procedure that Justice 
Ginsburg indeed loves. It was because of the kind of Justice she is: how she 
thinks about the law, how she approaches cases before the Court, and how 
she is able to argue persuasively as an advocate within the Court just as she 
once did as an advocate before the Court.
  Justice Ginsburg knows the Court’s cases are ultimately about people, 
their lives, and their livelihoods. The Justice, throughout her career, has 
been a true intellectual and champion of legal doctrine promoting so-
cial justice. But she also understands that the cases before the Court are 
far more than debates about abstract legal propositions. They are about 
people like Sally Reed in Reed v. Reed. About Lilly Ledbetter in Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. And about the young women who in Au-
gust 997 became the first female cadets at the Virginia Military Institute 
in the aftermath of the Court’s ruling in United States v. Virginia. The 
Justice is well known for reminding her law clerks of the biblical com-
mand “Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue,” which she keeps on the wall 
of her chambers. And she never loses sight of the fundamentally human 
aspect of the Court’s work.
 In  Norfolk, the Court affirmed the jury’s verdict notwithstanding, rath-
er than in light of, the full import of the Court’s ruling because of its ap-
preciation for what any other ruling would have meant in an immediate 
and concrete way for the six individual plaintiffs: Freeman Ayers, Carl 
Butler, Doyle Johnson, John Shirley, James Spangler, and Clifford Vance. 
These six individuals were suffering from asbestosis, a serious and pro-
gressive respiratory illness, and had been for decades. Because, moreover, 
the jury had issued its judgment as a general verdict, there was no way to 
know whether they had received all or none of their total of $5,89,000 
damages based on their allegations of fear of cancer. Norfolk’s concerns 
about the impact of the fear of cancer instruction on the total damages 
awarded by the jury were therefore potentially grounded only in theory 
rather than in reality.
  But what was clear and not at all theoretical was what would have 
been the practical effort of a judicial remand for a new trial based on 9
inadequate jury instructions: None of the six plaintiffs would have re-
ceived any relief for their harm within a meaningful time frame, if ever, 
before they were no longer alive. When the Court ruled in March 00, 
the plaintiffs were then 74, 70, 69, 7, 77, and 8 years old and each 
was in poor and deteriorating health. More than a decade had transpired 
since many had filed their original complaints. Anything other than a 
straightforward affirmance of the jury verdict would most likely have 
ended their case for all meaningful purposes.
 The  Norfolk opinion also reflects Justice Ginsburg’s humility and 
modesty regarding the role of the Court itself. The ruling is respectful 
not only of the plaintiffs themselves, but also of the state court system, 
extending to the state trial judge, the individual members of the jury, 
and their verdict. Such a verdict warrants the Court’s utmost respect and 
should not be disturbed merely because it could be, but only if it must 
be. A sincere and genuine application of judicial restraint.
  Justice Ginsburg crafted an opinion that allowed for a change in legal 
doctrine as needed to address the concerns of the Justices about exces-
sive damage awards to victims of asbestosis. But quietly and carefully 
in a case far below the spotlight, she ensured that the Court’s ruling re-
mained kind, just, and respectful in its application to the parties before 
the Court. And also in its deference to the state court system.
  That’s a Justice pursuing Justice in all respects.
m
Endnote
	  Thanks to Miriam Seifter and Zachary Tripp, former clerks to Justice 
Ginsburg, for their very helpful comments.